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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant appeals from a final order of the Emery County Seventh 
District Court entered by the Honorable George M. Harmond, Jr. on 
December 12, 2014. This Court has jurisdiction by assignment from the 
Utah Supreme Court under UTAH CODE§ 78A-4-103(2)G). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellee accepts the issues that Appellant has framed as being his 
issues on appeal. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Appellee is unaware of any dispositive Constitutional provisions, 
statutes, rules, or regulations that are determinative of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Reed Brasher brought this action against Vikki Christensen, asserting 
claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, promissory estoppel, and declaratory relief. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Brasher filed his Complaint on May 28, 2013 and Christensen filed 
her Answer on June 24, 2013. [R.001-005 and R. 067-071]. Trial was 
1 
conducted on July 10, 2014 and the trial court entered its Order in favor of 
Christensen on December 12, 2014 [R. 546]. 
C. Disposition in the Court Below 
The trial court entered its Memorandum Decision on September 17, 
2014, followed by its Order on December 12, 2014.[R.526 and 546]. The 
trial court's Order denied each of Brasher's claims and ruled that (1) the 
parties did not have a meeting of the minds about Christensen leasing water 
to Brasher in 2013; (2) that the 2013 Water Use Authorization ("WUA") 
was not an independent enforceable contract; and (3) that Christensen's 
promise to allow Brasher to use water in 2013 was conditioned on his 
purchase of her farm. [R.546-552]. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS1 
1. Christensen owns 260 acres of real property ("the Farm"), a house, 
and the rights to use irrigation water, in Emery County Utah. The irrigation 
water is represented by shares of stock in the Huntington-Cleveland 
Irrigation Company ("HCIC") consisting of 605.55 shares of stock classified 
as "A" water, and 175 shares of stock classified as "B" water. 
1 All facts are the findings of fact taken from the trial court's Order [R.546 
passim]. 
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2. Brasher does not reside in Emery County, but owns or leases 
approximately 100 acres of land in the county. Brasher also owns 15 shares 
of"A" water stock and 90 shares of "B" water stock in the HCIC. The water 
Brasher owns allows him to irrigate only 45 acres of ground, and he must 
lease enough water each year to irrigate the remaining ground. 
3. Brasher had leased 215 shares of" A" water from Christensen in the 
year 2012, using the water from April 2012 through the end of the water 
year, October 31, 2012. 
4. HCIC requires those leasing water from HCIC shareholders provide to 
HCIC a "Water Use Authorization" form ("WUA"), which is provided by 
HCIC. The WUA authorized HCIC to deliver the shareholder's water to the 
third party. 
5. In this case, the WUA for 2012 directed HCIC to deliver 215 shares of 
Class "A" HCIC water stock to Brasher for the water year 2012. Brasher 
asked Christensen to lease the water to him "until further notice" in 2012, 
but Christensen declined to do so and informed HCIC of that fact. Brasher 
wrote Christensen a check for $1,290.00 for the lease of the 215 shares of 
water, which Christensen later cashed. 
6. In February of 2013, Brasher needed additional water shares in order 
to qualify for a subsidized federal program to install sprinkler irrigation on 
3 
his Emery county property. Brasher called Christensen and asked to lease 
water as he had done in 2012, but Christensen refused. Brasher called 
Christensen two more times, and Christensen stated that she did not know if 
she wanted to lease the water and she wanted to see about selling the farm. 
7. On March 10, 2013, Brasher called Christensen and offered $5,000.00 
earnest money to put down on the purchase of the farm and water. Brasher, 
Christensen, and Nedra Swasey, a friend of Christensen's met on March 13, 
2013 at Christensen's home to discuss the sale. Brasher brought with him a 
blank WUA from HCIC and a blank "Offer to Purchase Real Estate" form. 
Brasher and Christensen negotiated the sale of the farm, and Swasey filled 
out the Offer to Purchase. 
8. The Offer to Purchase required Brasher to pay $5,000.00 "Earnest 
Money deposit paid to Owner with this Offer." Brasher indicated that 
during the meeting that he had the check to leave the $5,000.00 earnest 
money, but did not do so. 
9. During the meeting, Brasher filled out the WUA himself. The terms 
"payable 3/15 each year" was not filled in at the March 13, 2013, meeting, 
nor was the term "2018." Christensen told Brasher at the meeting that the 
water would only be leased to him on a year-to-year basis. Brasher took the 
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WUA with him when he left the meeting, and never provided a copy to 
Christensen. 
1 0.Brasher left a check for Christensen in the amount of $1,290.00, for 
the lease of the water shares. However, Christensen told Swasey prior to the 
March 13, 2013 meeting that should would not lease Brasher her water 
shares unless he bought the farm. Christensen believed the offer to lease 
water was contingent upon she and Brasher finalizing the offer to sell the 
farm. 
I I.During the meeting, both parties signed the WUA and the Offer to 
Purchase Real Estate. Christensen told Brasher that before anything was 
finally, she had to discuss both offers with her family and attorney. 
Christensen never cashed the check for the water shares. 
12.On March 14, 2013, Brasher called Swasey and Christensen asking if 
Christensen had made a decision, and Brasher was informed that Christensen 
needed more time. 
13.On March 17, 2013, Brasher called Christensen four times. 
Christensen did not answer, so Brasher left messages on her cell phone. 
Brasher called Christensen again on March 21, 2013, and twice on March 
24, 2013. Brasher believed at this time that his Offer to Purchase the Farm 
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had not been accepted, but he had already taken the WUA to HCIC on 
March 13, 2013. 
14.Toward the end of April, Christensen's real estate agent notified 
Brasher that Christensen wanted a higher price for the Farm. Brasher 
indicated he was not interested in paying more money for the Farm, so the 
parties did not pursue the sale of the Farm and associated water. 
15 .Brasher began drawing water from HCIC in April. Sometime near the 
end of April or beginning of May, 2013, HCIC made contact with 
Christensen as to whether she intended to lease the water shares to 
Christensen for a number of years. This was the first time Christensen knew 
Brasher was drawing on her water shares. Christensen then took the steps 
necessary to terminate Brasher' s use of the water. 
16.After termination of his use of Christensen's water shares, Brasher 
brought this action, seeking damages for the loss of his alfalfa crop for the 
year 2013, and for damages to his cattle operation extending over the 





SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly determined that the parties did not have a 
meeting of the minds to create a binding contract because Christensen's 
agreement to let Brasher use her water in 2013 was conditioned upon him 
purchasing her farm. 
Additionally, the 2013 WUA was not a separate, integrated, and 
independently enforceable contract that gave Brasher a right to call for water 
in 2013 if he did not purchase Christensen's farm. 
In making its determinations and fact findings, the trial court had 
sufficient evidence through Nedra Swasey and Vikki Christensen to support 
its determination that the 2013 WUA was conditioned upon Brasher 
purchasing the Farm. 
Finally, Brasher's promissory estoppel claim failed because (1) there 
was no unequivocal promise by Christensen that Brasher reasonably relied 
upon since their negotiations were nothing more than negotiations; and (2) 
Christensen did not know that Brasher had relied upon her conditional 
promise and did not reasonably expect her conditional promise to induce 
action by Brasher -since she did not intend to lease the water unless it was 
part of the farm sale. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. The trial court correctly determined that there was no meeting of 
the minds between the parties to create a binding contract. 
It is a condition precedent to the formation of any contract that the 
parties have a meeting of the minds and it must be spelled out, either 
expressly or implicitly, with "sufficient definiteness to be enforced."2 
Additionally, the issue of whether the parties had a meeting of the minds is 
reviewed for clear error, reversing only where the finding is clearly 
erroneous. 
3 The analysis depends on whether the parties "actually intended 
to contract", with the question of intent left to the trial court's determination 
and assessment. 4 
Brasher has not marshaled the evidence in contesting this particular 
finding by the trial court. Instead, he simply argues that the trial court got 
tangled up in the Offer to Purchase the farm and therefore missed an 
apparently separate oral agreement between Brasher and Christensen that 
was memorialized by the 2013 WUA.5 
2 Commercial Union Associates v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 37 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
3 See Terry v. Bacon, 269 P.3d 188, 192; 195 (Utah Ct. App. 2011). 
4 Id at 195. 
5 As part of his argument here, Brasher uses the word "integrated" as a simile for 
interrelated or interdependent. Christensen assumes that the use of "integrated" in 
this argument is different from Brasher's later contention that the 2013 WUA was 
an "integrated contract." 
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Brasher correctly states that the 2013 WUA and the Offer to Purchase 
the farm were separate documents. He also correctly states that neither of 
the documents references the other. But it is far too simplistic to conclude 
that the two documents are not interrelated. Contract negotiations often 
include side agreements and conditions. That was the case here -if Brasher 
bought Christensen's farm, then she was willing to also lease him some 
additional water for his other properties. If he did not buy her farm, then 
Brasher was not allowed to use her water. 
The trial court found the following: 
• Brasher tried at least three times in early 2013 to lease 
Christensen's water and she declined three times [R.548: 118-
23]; 
• Brasher and Christensen finally met one time in March 2013 to 
discuss leasing the water AND Brasher' s interest in purchasing 
the farm [R. 549:124 through 550:130]; 
• At the meeting, Christensen told Brasher that she need to 
discuss both documents with her family and with her attorney 
before anything was final [R.551 :135]; 
• After the meeting, Brasher could not reach Christensen and she 
did not return his multiple calls. She also did not cash his 
check; [R.551 :136-39]. 
It is apparent from the testimony at trial and the trial court's findings 
of fact that Brasher wanted to use Christensen's water and she was not very 
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interested in leasing it to him. And she did not enter into a lease. Instead, 
she made it clear to him that if he purchased her farm, she would lease him 
the additional water that he wanted for his existing property. Accordingly, 
they negotiated a proposed sale of the farm and the possible use of the water 
if the sale went through. And Christensen made it clear that she needed to 
speak with her family and her attorney before anything was final. But 
Brasher called on the water anyway, trying to enforce a small portion of the 
parties' negotiations even though it was apparent to the trial court that the 
2013 WU A and the Offer to Purchase were interrelated and dependent on 
each other as a package deal. 
Brasher contends that he legitimately believed the 2013 WUA 
represented a binding contract. Christensen made it clear that, in her mind, 
Brasher' s right to draw water in 2013 was conditional on his purchase of the 
farm. In other words, the parties did not have a common understanding or 
intention to contract. And that means there was no meeting of the minds. 
B. The 2013 Water Use Authorization is not, according to its 
express terms, an integrated or independently binding contract. 
Brasher argues that the 2013 WUA was, by itself, a fully formed and 
independently enforceable contract. He further argues that it is fully 
10 
integrated so that parol evidence could not be introduced at trial to determine 
the parties' intentions. 
1. The 2013 WUA does not contain the required elements for an 
enforceable contract. 
The essential elements of a contract include 1) offer, 2) acceptance, 3) 
competent parties, and 3) consideration. 6 Brasher contends that all of those 
elements are present on the face of the 2013 WUA -as long as the tendered 
check $1,290.00 is also considered a part of the document. 
But virtually none of the required elements for contract formation are 
present within the 2013 WUA. First, the document is a form between a 
water owner and the Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Company ("HCIC") 
directing the company to deliver water to a third-party lessee.[R.547113]. It 
is not an agreement between a water owner and a lessee. It is a document 
designed to protect HCIC from liability.[R.547113]. 
Second, the document specifically states that the WU A is a directive 
from a water owner to HCIC because the water owner already has " ... a lease 
and/or other agreement" that defines the terms between the water owner and 
the lessee. [R.551 ,I3]. On its face, the WUA specifically references a 
6 Uhrhahn Const. & Design, Inc. v. Hopkins, 179 P.3d 808, 813 (Utah Ct. App. 
2008). 
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separate agreement between the water owner and lessee that defines their 
relationship. [R.551 ,2]. 
Third, there is no language of offer or acceptance contained within the 
WUA. 
Fourth, there is no consideration for the WUA. The trial court 
determined that the term "Payable 3/15 of each year" was not part of the 
WUA when it was signed by Brasher and Christensen. [R.549 ,32]. Brasher 
argues that consideration can be found in the tendered-but-never-cashed 
check for $1,290.00, but that check constitutes the same kind of extrinsic 
evidence that he wants to exclude. 
Finally, there is no defined term (length of contract) for the WUA. 
Two options were available and neither box was checked. And the trial 
court determined that the term "2018" was not part of the WUA when it was 
signed by Brasher and Christensen.[R.549 ,32]. 
Of the four main elements for contract formation, only one -
competent parties - existed here with respect to the 2013 WUA. 
12 
G;_.. 
2. Even if it were a contract, the 2013 WUA was not integrated. 
Parol evidence is typically not admissible to vary or add to the terms 
of an integrated contract. 7 And a contract is integrated if the parties adopted 
the writing as "a final and complete expression of their bargain."8 If a 
contract is integrated, parol evidence may still be admissible if the contract 
is ambiguous (i.e. capable of more than one reasonable interpretation 
because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies) and the intentions of the parties cannot be determined by the 
plain language of the agreement. 9 
Here, there was no integration clause for the 2013 WUA stating that it 
was the final agreement between Christensen and Brasher. Instead, the 
WUA contains an "anti-integration clause" that specifically states that there 
is a separate" ... lease and/or other agreement" that provides the terms for the 
Brasher/Christensen transaction. 
Additionally, there is no stated consideration due date or term for the 
contract, except as those were added by someone after the March 2013 
meeting but before trial. And there is no defined consideration amount in 
the WUA at all. 
1 Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 182 P.3d 326, 330 (Utah 2008). 
8 Id. 
9 DCH Holdings, LLC v. Nielsen, 220 P .3d 178, 181 (Utah Ct.App. 2009). 
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The trial court determined that the 2013 WUA was not an enforceable 
contract because it was, by its terms, conditioned on a lease or other 
agreement. [R.551 12]. In other words, it was not a final and complete 
expression of the Brasher/Christensen negotiations. Presumably, the 
absence of a consideration amount, due date, and contract term are also other 
factors considered by the trial court in determining that there was more to 
the parties' negotiations and bargaining than just the 2013 WUA. And parol 
evidence was justified to determine the terms of their agreement, if any. 
C. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact are supported by sufficient 
evidence. 
When challenging a finding of fact, an Appellant must marshal all of 
the evidence supporting the fact and then explain why the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the fact when viewed in a light most favorable to the 
trial court. 10 And an appellant may not simply re-argue the facts presented at 
. 1 11 tna. 
1. "Brasher filled out the 2013 WUA himself. The term 'payable 
3/15 each year' was not filled in at the March 13th meeting, nor 
was the term '2018"'. 
Brasher contends that " ... there is no specific information in the record 
concerning this finding of fact," although the marshaled facts from Nedra 




Swasey' s testimony specifically support the finding of fact. In support of his 
argument, Brasher simply re-argues the facts he presented at trial, stating 
that Swasey's testimony is "qualified" and "unconvincing given the clear 
and direct testimony offered by Brasher." 12 Brasher even tries to introduce 
items outside the record by way of a footnote 3, contending that it is "readily 
apparent" that Brasher did not write the term "2018" .13 
Notably, Brasher also claims that Christensen's statements at trial 
contradict Swasey. He states that Christensen "acknowledged" that the 
phrase "payable 3/15 each year" was the date of payment "indicated on the 
2013 WUA". 14 But Brasher's use of the word "acknowledged" is a careful 
mischaracterization of Christensen's statements. Christensen was asked: 
Q. With regard to Exhbit 1, immediately to the right-hand side of 
the designation 215 shares of class A water it states, "Payable 
3-15 of each year." Do you see that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So was it your understanding the payment was to be made on 
the 15th of March each year of this particular water use 
authorization? 
A. No. [TT.22:18 through 23:5]. 
In other words, Christensen admitted that the document 
introduced into evidence, and presented to her at trial, contained the 
12 See Appellant's Brief at 21, ,I2. 
13 Id at Footnote 3. 
14 Id at p.20. 
15 
phrase "payable 3/15 each year" on its face. But she specifically 
disputed that it was a payment term of the 2013 WUA. 
Nedra Swasey specifically testified that at the March 2013 meeting, 
the 2013 WUA did not contain the same terms as the version Brasher offered 
at trial. She said: 
• "All of it was not written out"; 
• The phrase "payable 3-15 of each year" was not written out; 
• And Swasey did not remember an ending date on the paper and 
did not believe that "2018" was filled in when the paper left 
Christensen's home. [TT. 205:18 through 206:19]. 
Admittedly, Brasher disagrees and contradicts Swasey's testimony. 
But Swasey' s testimony provides sufficient evidence to support the finding 
-particularly where the standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence. 
2. "Christensen told Brasher [during the March 13, 2013 meeting[ 
that the water would only be leased to him on a year to year 
basis.". 
Brasher contends that this finding of fact is contravened by trial 
testimony because the only witness to this fact was Nedra Swasey who 
testified, "Yes. Vikki told [Brasher] it would be on a year-to-year basis." 
[TT: 205: 18-206: 19]. 
16 
It appears that Brasher believes he is a more reliable witness than 
Nedra Swasey. He contends that her testimony was "hazy" when compared 
to his own. But his belief about his own credibility does not make the 
finding of fact unsupported by the trial testimony. It simply means that the 
trial court apparently believed Swasey-and not Brasher. 
3. "Both parties signed the WUA and the Offer to Purchase but 
Christensen informed Brasher that she need to discus both offers 
with her family and with her attorney before anything was final.,,_ 
In support of this fact, Christensen testified at trial several times that 
she believed the water and the farm purchase were intertwined in the sense 
that she would only lease the water to Brasher if he also bought the farm. 
Admittedly, Christensen's testimony in the transcript is not a model of 
clarity, but the trial court apparently understood the gist of it in making its 
findings of fact. Christensen testified as follows: 
• "That I cancelled the lease because he had called-I didn't know he 
was going to come back and buy the farm, but he just started using 
water. And they called me on it. And I said, 'No, he wasn't supposed 
to until I got back with my attorney to see whether I was going to 
sell it or not.' If he---1 sold it to him, then I'd rent him that water for 
a few years. If my attorney and my f amity didn't think it was right, 
then I wouldn't. And he was already using water." [TT. 32: 7-16] 
• " ... I was supposed to be able to go to my attorney and ask if this was 
okay to sell for this price. And in the meantime, he was going to 
bring some earnest money, as it shows on here. But he didn't bring 
any earnest money. And the next thing, I get a call he was using the 
17 
water. And he was only to use the water if he bought the farm." [TT. 
53: 19 through 54: 1]. 
• Q. What was your understanding about this document [2013 WUA]? 
A. Well, it was just ---he was supposed to just hang on until I got---
seen you and got everything done before I said yes, I'll--- it's a 
go. And before I done that, he started using water. [TT. 217:8-13]. 
• A. No. none of it was supposed to be legal. 
Q. What do you mean by that? I think we understand your testimony. 
A. Yeah, that it was not - I was going to you and a few people to see 
if it was. And that's what I told him. I won't---none of this is good 
here today. 
Q. Including this document [2013 WUA]? You wanted to check with 
others as well, as part of it all; is that correct? 
A. Yeah, on this -on the first one-the real estate. 
Q. Did you think you were leasing him any water by itself/ 
A. No. [TT.217:25 through 218:14]. 
As with the other findings of fact, there is sufficient evidence in the 
record to support the trial court's finding. 
D. Promissory estoppel was not a viable cause of action because 
the water use was conditioned upon Brasher purchasing 
Christensen's farm. 
The trial court determined that "Christensen's promise to allow 
Brasher to draw water in 2013 was conditioned upon Brasher purchasing the 
Farm." [R. 551 '17]. Brasher has not really challenged this determination 
except to re-argue his trial court position. 
18 
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Most importantly for this case, the first element of promissory 
estoppel requires a promise by the defendant and an act by the plaintiff in 
reasonable reliance on the promise.15 The second element requires that the 
defendant knew that the plaintiff had relied on the promise which the 
defendant should reasonably expect to induce action on the part of the 
plaintiff .16 
Here, the trial court determined that any promise by Christensen to 
deliver water in 2013 was conditioned upon Brasher's purchase of her Farm. 
And a conditional promise does not support a promissory estoppel claim. 
Instead, it could be characterized as nothing more than a preliminary 
negotiation. t7 
But the second element is also not met under the trial court's findings 
either. The trial court determined that "Christensen believed the water lease 
was part of the Farm sale and .... did not intend to lease the water to Brasher 
unless he purchased the farm ... " [R. 551 ,6]. The Court also found that the 
first time Christensen knew Brasher was drawing on her water was in late 
April or the beginning of May 2013 and " ... she took steps to terminate 
15 Youngbloodv. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 158 P.3d 1088, 1092 (Utah 2007). 
16 Id. 
17 See Nunley v. Westates Casing Services, Inc., 989 P.2d 1077, 1089 (Utah 1999). 
19 
Brasher's use of the water, instructing HCIC to stop allowing Brasher's 
use." [R. 550 ,41-42]. 
Christensen did not know Brasher had relied on the conditional 
promise and did not reasonably expect her conditional promise to induce 
action by Brasher since she did not intend to lease the water unless it was 
part of the farm sale . 
Accordingly, under the trial court's findings, Brasher's promissory 
estoppel claim fails under the first two elements of the claim. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
order and award Vikki Christensen her costs on appeal. 
SUBMITTED this 2i11 day of July, 2015. 
TORGERSON LAW OFFICES, P .C. 
By:Do~~z~ 
Attorney for the Appellee 
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